As of 21 September 2026, France remains militarily engaged at the margins of two wars without being a formal belligerent in either, has this week convened the planning for the successor to a third deployment where it lost a peacekeeper this spring, and — according to a defence ministry source quoted by Le Monde — is already conducting undeclared operations against Russia. The week's centrepiece was Lebanon. On 17 September President Emmanuel Macron hosted Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Jordan's King Abdullah II in Paris alongside European and Arab political and military chiefs to assess the needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces and prepare for the end of UNIFIL, whose mandate expires at the end of the year (Associated Press, 17 September 2026; Al Jazeera, 17 September 2026). The Times of Israel reported (September 2026) that officials weighed two options — a new international mission operating outside a UN mandate, or a European Union-led mission — both centred on training, equipment, intelligence sharing and mentoring for the Lebanese army rather than a peacekeeping footprint. The National reported (16 and 17 September 2026) that France and Italy are leading the effort, that more than ten EU states have signalled readiness to contribute, and that Aoun welcomed the French-led talks; The Jerusalem Post reported (September 2026) that Beirut is seeking a UN-backed replacement while the United States opposes extending UNIFIL's mandate, and Al-Monitor (September 2026) described Paris as pushing to keep a UNIFIL-type presence beyond 2026. Al Jazeera noted that the June ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon appears under strain as Israel hardens its position ahead of its October elections and US-brokered talks falter. Roughly 600 French soldiers continue to serve with UNIFIL in the south (France 24, 2 September 2026), and the April ambush that killed a French peacekeeper remains the deployment's gravest recent loss (Al Jazeera, 18 April 2026). In the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz crisis that began at the end of February shows no sign of resolution. Iran's Revolutionary Guards navy said on 18 September that it had struck a Togolese-flagged oil tanker, the Trend, on the night of 17 September and set it ablaze for what it called an 'illegal' transit; there was no immediate independent confirmation of the strike or the fire (RFE/RL live blog, September 2026; ABC News live updates, September 2026). Iran's security chief Mohsen Rezaei told Al Jazeera, in an interview published 19 September, that consultations with mediators Qatar and Pakistan were continuing and that Tehran was awaiting a response from President Trump. That followed the sharpest escalation in months: Axios reported (2 September 2026) that the United States struck Iranian oil tankers for the first time in retaliation for Iranian attacks on shipping, CNBC reported the same day that Iran said two tankers had hit naval mines in the strait, a claim the US disputed, and Al Jazeera characterised the exchanges (6 September 2026) as a US-Iran 'tanker war'. France's stated position has not changed: the foreign ministry says Minister Jean-Noël Barrot has called for the 'unconditional, unrestricted and immediate' reopening of the strait and reiterated France's willingness to contribute, 'when conditions allow and together with its partners', to guaranteeing freedom of navigation under the Franco-British initiative (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2026). That coalition of roughly twenty countries, with Oman's Port of Duqm as its logistics hub, has been described as ready to clear mines and escort tankers once conditions permit (Bloomberg, May 2026; France 24, 16 June 2026), and USNI News reported (9 March 2026) that the French Navy had pledged ten additional warships to the region; as of 19 September, commentary in RealClearDefense was still arguing for a Franco-British 'fleet-in-being' to be sent to the strait as leverage on Tehran, an indication that the escort mission itself has not begun. On Russia, Le Monde reported in mid-September, citing a source in the French Defence Ministry, that when asked whether Paris could respond militarily to Moscow without making it public the source replied 'this is already happening'; the paper said Macron had instructed the government to develop strategies to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive defence sites from what he called Russia's growing hybrid threat, and that it remained unclear where such operations take place — inside Russia, on the Ukrainian front, in cyberspace or against Russian influence networks (Le Monde, September 2026, as relayed by UAWire and EADaily, 19 September 2026). France co-leads the 'coalition of the willing', whose Paris Declaration of 6 January 2026 commits France and the United Kingdom to deploy a multinational force on Ukrainian territory only after a ceasefire (Council of the EU; CNN, 6 January 2026). No ceasefire exists. The Kyiv Independent reported (12 September 2026) that Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine's presidential office, said the next US-Russia-Ukraine trilateral round is slated for October, with NV reporting it is expected to focus on a limited ceasefire covering Black Sea commercial shipping and energy infrastructure; TASS quoted US envoy Steve Witkoff as saying a new trilateral meeting could be announced soon, and the Kremlin has said it does not rule out October talks (RBC-Ukraine). Meanwhile Russia's strikes continue: an overnight drone attack on the Kyiv region on 20 September killed four people, including three children and a woman (Associated Press via Honolulu Star-Advertiser, 20 September 2026). On NATO's eastern flank, France keeps its Mission Lynx contribution of roughly 250 troops in Estonia under British command and leads the multinational battle group at Cincu, Romania, under Mission Aigle (French Ministry of the Armed Forces press kits). In Africa, France's posture is post-Sahel: Anadolu Agency's factbox on France's fading military presence records withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, leaving Djibouti, with around 1,500 troops, as the main enduring foothold; Military Africa (August 2026) and Africa Defense Forum (July 2026) report that French personnel returned to Chad in April 2026 to resume training, intelligence work and limited deployments, nearly eighteen months after N'Djamena expelled French forces, on the explicit basis that no permanent bases will reopen and small teams deploy only with N'Djamena's approval. The region France left remains the epicentre of jihadist violence: ISPI and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies describe the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM as running a fuel blockade of Mali since September 2025 and systematically attacking commercial routes and mining infrastructure, Al Jazeera (26 April 2026) and France 24 (4 July 2026) reported that JNIM and allied Tuareg separatists captured Kidal in late April and killed Mali's defence minister, and the Associated Press reported (via Arab News, September 2026) that JNIM claimed a deadly attack on a Malian army camp and released video of captured soldiers. At the Security Council in July, France's representative warned that the Council 'cannot and must not look the other way' (UN press release SC/16413, July 2026). Further afield, the Air and Space Force's PEGASE 26 deployment — four Rafale fighters, three A330 MRTT tankers, two A400M transports and about 300 personnel on a 40,000-kilometre route from the Arctic to the Middle East between 8 September and 15 October (The Week, 12 September 2026; Defence Blog) — has completed its Alaska leg, where the Rafales trained with US Air Force F-22s (Zona Militar, 12 September 2026), and its Korean leg, where two Rafales flew with South Korean F-35A, F-15K, KF-16 and FA-50 fighters at Cheongju Air Base from 15 to 17 September (Zona Militar, 17 September 2026), with Indonesia, India, Qatar, Réunion and Egypt still ahead. Domestically, France remains on heightened terrorism alert with Operation Sentinelle soldiers deployed in its cities. France 24 (17 September 2026) and AFP (via Arab News and Malay Mail, 18 September 2026) reported that a 35-year-old police officer described by sources as adhering to 'a violent radical far-right ideology' was arrested on the street on 23 August, is suspected of planning violent attacks 'against the interests of the state' and of manufacturing 3D-printed weapons, and has been charged with preparing a terrorist act, unauthorised manufacture or trade in weapons in connection with a terrorist organisation, unauthorised weapon possession and incitement to terrorism via social media; he was placed in pretrial detention. Separately, the European Jewish Congress (September 2026) reported that three men were charged with terrorist conspiracy on suspicion of planning to join the Islamic State group in Africa and discussing an attack on the Jewish community, after a DGSI investigation opened in early July into a WhatsApp group called 'Soldiers of Allah'. On the force-structure side, Euronews reported (31 August 2026) that the new voluntary military service has begun with a first cohort of 3,000 volunteers aged 18 to 25, inducted between September and November for one month of basic training and nine months in operational units in mainland France or the overseas territories, freeing professional soldiers for front-line duties. In the Pacific, New Caledonia is calm but financially and politically fragile two years after the deadly 2024 riots. RNZ reported (5 September 2026) that Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced about €11 million to close the 2026 financial year and €50 million to balance the 2027 budget after meeting a bipartisan delegation led by territorial president Milakulo Tukumuli, and ABC News Australia reported (8 September 2026) a deepening debt crisis; Australia's Smartraveller advisory, updated 11 September 2026, still advises a high degree of caution because of the risk of civil disorder. The institutional track remains stalled: the Devpolicy Blog (4 May 2026) records that the constitutional bill implementing the Bougival (July 2025) and Élysée-Oudinot (January 2026) accords was defeated in the National Assembly when a rejection motion by pro-independence deputy Emmanuel Tijbaou passed 190 votes to 107, and the FLNKS independence coalition continues to demand full sovereignty. A modest normalisation signal came from tourism: Fiji Airways resumes direct Nadi–Nouméa flights on 22 September (New Caledonia Tourism). No armed conflict is taking place on French soil.
Last reviewed 2026-09-21 · 2 weeks ago